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Six	things	to	know	about	the	German	election
Ahead	of	Germany’s	federal	election	on	24	September,	Manès	Weisskircher	highlights	six	things
to	know	as	voters	go	to	the	polls.	While	many	observers	are	expecting	a	clear	victory	for	Angela
Merkel’s	CDU/CSU,	the	performance	of	smaller	parties	will	also	be	keenly	followed	as	it	is	highly
likely	there	will	be	as	many	as	six	parties	(or	seven	including	the	CSU)	represented	in	the
Bundestag.
Angela	Merkel,	Credit:	Markus	Spiske	(CC	BY	2.0)
Next	Sunday,	about	61.5	million	Germans	are	entitled	to	vote.	The	expected	fourth	consecutive	victory	for	Angela
Merkel’s	Christian	Democrats	is	a	crucial,	but	far	from	the	only	important	aspect	of	the	Bundestag	election.	Here
are	six	things	you	need	to	know	about	one	of	the	key	political	events	of	2017.
1.	 The	meaning	of	silence:	The	Eurozone’s	absence	from	the	campaign
Let	us	begin	with	what	the	election	campaign	has	not	been	about:	the	Eurozone	crisis	–	an	issue	that	shaped	the
public	agenda	of	Germany	until	the	summer	of	2015.	Granted,	the	composition	of	the	new	coalition	government
will	be	important	for	economic	policy	in	Europe,	including	the	next	more	or	less	substantial	reform	of	the
Eurozone.
Still,	Germany’s	major	political	players	have	preferred	not	to	politicise	the	issue	despite,	or	because	of,	the
debates	being	held	elsewhere,	such	as	the	French	proposals	on	the	deepening	of	European	economic
integration,	the	question	over	debt	relief	in	Greece	and	discussions	on	alternatives	to	the	euro	in	Italy.	Most
strikingly,	in	the	only	TV	debate	between	Angela	Merkel	and	Martin	Schulz,	the	two	politicians	did	not	discuss	the
Eurozone.	Instead,	it	was	another	topic	framed	in	a	European	context	that	overshadowed	any	other	issue:	the	so-
called	refugee	crisis.
2.	 Angela	Merkel	–	another	decisive	victory
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Six things to know about the German election Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-09-19
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/19/six-things-to-know-about-the-german-election/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
In	the	second	half	of	2015,	Angela	Merkel	reinvented	herself,	not	for	the	first	time.	Back	then,	she	became	widely
known,	in	Germany	and	beyond,	for	a	liberal	stance	on	asylum	and	immigration.	Reports	that	her	government
had	planned	to	close	down	the	border	to	Austria	in	mid-September	2015	–	a	decision	that	was	only	reversed	at
the	very	last	moment	and	primarily	because	of	self-serving	concerns	–	could	not	tarnish	this	image.	This	time
around,	Merkel	has	argued	that	the	efforts	of	2015	are	something	that	Germans	should	be	proud	of,	but	which
should	not	be	repeated.	If	the	polls	are	correct,	her	CDU,	together	with	their	Bavarian	‘sister	party’	the	CSU,	will
gain	35	to	40	percent	of	the	vote,	clearly	winning	her	fourth	Bundestag	election	as	the	centre-right’s	candidate	for
Chancellor.
Merkel’s	political	success	story	is	remarkable.	Initially	perceived	as	lacking	charisma,	she	only	narrowly	beat
Gerhard	Schröder’s	SPD	in	2005,	even	though	a	landslide	victory	for	her	was	expected.	But	soon	after,	Merkel’s
increasing	popularity	could	no	longer	be	halted,	even	by	some	serious	flip-flopping,	like	when	she	moved	back
from	her	extension	of	the	‘Red-Green’	nuclear	power	phase-out	period	after	the	Fukushima	disaster	in	Japan.
Beyond	the	traditional	strength	of	the	centre-right	in	Germany,	commentators	often	attribute	Merkel’s	success	to	a
strategy	of	passivity.	Instead	of	pushing	forward	with	her	own	initiatives,	Merkel	rather	responds	to	what	is
politically	salient,	often	very	late	in	the	day	and	after	the	dust	has	settled.	Pundits	have	called	her	approach
‘asymmetric	demobilisation’	–	by	moving	to	the	centre	on	some	issues,	the	SPD	struggles	to	mobilise	sections	of
its	own	potential	support	base.	At	a	party	congress,	Merkel’s	Social	Democratic	contender	Martin	Schulz	called
this	approach	an	“attack	on	democracy”	–	a	wording	which	he	later	refused	to	repeat.	Still,	a	previous	observation
of	a	well-known	pundit,	that	“Merkel	does	not	win,	her	opponents	lose”,	has	not	done	full	justice	to	her	strategic
skills	in	not	only	winning	elections,	but	winning	them	decisively.
3.	 The	Social	Democratic	Party	–	in	a	never-ending	crisis?
In	2013,	after	gaining	another	bad	result	(25.7%),	Sigmar	Gabriel,	then	SPD	party	leader	and	soon	Vice
Chancellor,	made	a	smart	move.	Holding	an	intra-party	referendum	on	the	coalition	agreement	with	the	Christian
Democrats,	he	made	sure	that	some	important	demands	would	find	their	way	into	government	policy.	The
introduction	of	a	minimum	wage	was	one	of	these.	Nevertheless,	this	did	not	help	the	party’s	public	support.
Welfare	state	retrenchment	under	Schröder	has	cast	a	long	shadow	and	has	aided	the	establishment	of	the	left-
wing	Die	Linke	as	electoral	competition.
Still,	despite	these	long-term	problems	for	the	SPD,	at	the	beginning	of	2017	it	suddenly	looked	like	the	party
could	actually	challenge	the	dominance	of	Merkel.	In	accordance	with	a	decision	made	by	the	party	leadership,
Gabriel	proposed	Martin	Schulz,	the	former	President	of	the	European	Parliament,	as	the	SPD’s	leading
candidate	for	Chancellor.	Quicker	than	even	Schulz	could	have	hoped	for,	his	poll	numbers	rose	to	almost	match
Merkel’s,	and	the	outcome	of	the	election	suddenly	seemed	to	be	open.	However,	after	a	few	weeks	this	‘Schulz
effect’	turned	out	to	be	merely	a	flash	in	the	pan.	The	candidate	failed	to	substantiate	his	spontaneous	popularity
by	formulating	and	popularising	policy	demands,	such	as	“credible	social	welfare	and	redistributive	policies”,	that
would	put	pressure	on	the	incumbent	Chancellor.	Polls	now	predict	only	20-25	percent	of	the	vote	will	go	to	the
Social	Democrats.
While	the	SPD	publicly	claims	to	still	hope	for	undecided	voters,	political	observers	have	largely	written	Merkel’s
challenger	off.	Still,	the	brief	‘Schulz	effect’	might	indicate	that	if	he	had	campaigned	differently,	another	electoral
outcome	would	have	been	possible	–	Merkel’s	position	might	not	have	been	as	untouchable	as	it	now	again
seems.	As	for	what	lies	next	for	the	SPD,	the	party	will	either	stay	as	the	junior	coalition	partner	of	the	CDU/CSU
or	it	will	become	Germany’s	main	opposition	party,	which	may	give	it	the	chance	“to	regroup	and	reflect”.
Previous	experience	suggests	that	in	both	cases	a	revival	of	the	SPD	will	be	difficult	to	achieve.
4.	 A	radical	right	party	in	the	Bundestag:	the	AfD
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For	the	first	time	ever,	a	radical	right	party	will	surpass	the	five	percent	threshold	and	enter	the	Bundestag.
Starting	out	as	an	expression	of	neoliberal	opposition	to	the	Eurozone,	the	Alternative	für	Deutschland
(Alternative	for	Germany)	managed	to	reach	4.7	percent	of	the	vote	in	2013.	A	year	later,	the	AfD	entered	the
European	Parliament	with	slightly	over	seven	percent	of	the	vote,	matching	the	record	result	for	a	far	right	party	at
national-level	elections	in	the	Federal	Republic:	In	1989,	Die	Republikaner	gained	7.1	percent	in	that	year’s
European	Parliament	election.	However,	similar	to	other	German	far	right	parties	such	as	the	NPD	or	the	DVU,
Die	Republikaner	failed	to	consolidate	their	short-term	success.	Not	so	the	AfD.
The	radical	right	faction	of	the	party	took	over	in	the	summer	of	2015,	when	the	AfD’s	founder,	MEP	Bernd	Lucke,
suffered	a	decisive	defeat	in	an	intra-party	struggle	and	left,	together	with	some	of	his	supporters.	Frauke	Petry
became	one	of	the	two	new	party	leaders.	Despite	this	break	with	the	party’s	origins,	its	internal	struggles
remained	–	peaking	with	the	sidelining	of	party	leader	Petry	ahead	of	the	2017	campaign.	This	might	be	part	of
the	explanation	for	why	the	likely	result	of	the	AfD	will	be	below	its	peak	poll	numbers	of	slightly	above	15	percent
only	a	year	ago.	Nevertheless,	the	AfD	–	notably	without	a	charismatic	leader	at	the	helm	–	will	establish	itself	as
a	major	radical	right	party	in	German	politics.	The	party’s	future	impact	on	the	party	system,	and	especially	on	the
CDU/CSU,	remains	to	be	seen.
5.	 The	return	of	the	Liberals	makes	the	Bundestag	a	six-party	legislature
In	2013,	the	liberal	FDP	suffered	a	crushing	electoral	defeat:	After	four	years	as	junior	coalition	partner	to	Merkel,
the	party	was	voted	out	of	parliament,	for	the	very	first	time	in	its	proud	history.	Following	that	disastrous	result,	a
comeback	was	far	from	clear.	But	it	seems	certain	that	the	FDP	is	about	to	return,	with	its	young	party	leader
Christian	Lindner	building	support	around	talk	of	a	liberal	‘lifestyle’	and	the	importance	of	digitalisation	–	while
also	calling	for	stronger	regulation	of	immigration.
Unsurprisingly,	The	Economist	has	already	stated	its	support	for	a	return	of	the	FDP	to	national	government	as
part	of	a	three-party	‘Jamaica	coalition’	with	Merkel’s	CDU/CSU	and	the	Greens.	But	even	if	the	FDP	does	not
end	up	in	the	next	German	government,	their	return	from	extra-parliamentary	opposition	must	be	seen	as	a
notable	success	–	facilitated	through	the	help	of	financially	strong	donors.	By	the	beginning	of	August,	the	FDP
had	received	almost	eight	times	as	many	donations	above	€50,000	than	the	SPD	and	the	Greens	together,	while
only	the	Christian	Democrats	received	more	financial	support	from	donations	of	this	type.
With	the	AfD	and	the	FDP	entering	the	Bundestag,	for	the	first	time	ever	six	parties	will	pass	the	five	percent
threshold	(or	seven	if	the	CDU	and	CSU	are	counted	as	separate	parties).	So	far,	polls	do	not	provide	a	clear
picture	of	which	of	the	four	parties	behind	the	CDU/CSU	and	the	SPD	will	become	the	third	strongest.
6.	 The	Left	and	the	Greens:	no	agenda	setters
The	only	two	opposition	parties	currently	in	the	Bundestag	will	not	be	the	headliners	of	this	year’s	election
coverage.	While	Die	Linke	might	lose	its	position	as	the	strongest	opposition	group	in	parliament,	the	polls
nevertheless	predict	a	stable	result	for	the	party.	Since	2005,	the	radical	left	has	never	received	less	than	eight
percent.	However,	its	social	and	economic	policy	demands	have	not	strongly	shaped	mainstream	political
discourse	in	recent	months.	A	similar	disappointment,	at	least	for	the	office-seeking	wing	of	Die	Linke,	is	that	with
the	SPD	in	such	a	weak	state	there	is	no	prospect	of	coalition	participation	at	the	national	level.
The	Greens	have	also	not	been	at	the	centre	of	attention.	Some	demands	made	by	the	party,	such	as	an	end	for
new	registrations	of	internal	combustion	engine	cars	by	2030,	have	also	led	to	intraparty	conflict.	Winfried
Kretschmann,	Ministerpräsident	of	Baden-Württemberg,	a	centre	for	the	car	industry,	has	rejected	such	a
deadline.	Beyond	Baden-Württemberg,	the	Greens	currently	govern	in	seven	more	German	regions.	Also	at	the
national	level,	the	party	leadership	clearly	follows	an	office-seeking	approach.	While	increasingly	engaging	in
rhetorical	skirmishes	with	the	FDP,	the	Greens’	flexibility	on	policy	ensures	a	‘Jamaica	coalition’	remains	a	real
possibility.	Still,	whether	the	Greens	will	govern	or	not	may	ultimately	depend	less	on	themselves	and	more	on
those	that	will	remain	the	main	players	of	German	politics	after	24	September:	Angela	Merkel	and	her	fellow
Christian	Democrats.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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